This article aims at providing an historical analysis of the Hijaz Revolt (1916) which was led by the Emir of Mecca Sharif Husayn against the Ottoman Empire and which can be considered the turning point of TurkishArab relations in the 20 th century. The main argument of this article is that although it opened a new phase in the course of Turkish -Arab relations and was marked as a traumatic moment in the social memory of the Turkish people, the Hijaz Revolt does not represent an overvvhelming expression of an Arab or Islamic sentiment against the Ottoman Empire. It was rather a local reaction which took advantage of the general state of the Great War and the imperialist designs of the British in the Middle East, and which used the religion as an instrument to legitimise itself in the eyes of the Islamic world. 
Introduction
The Ottomans established their domination över many parts of the Arab Middle East and North Africa during the 16 ,h century. The main incentive for this domination was to maintain the security of the traditional spice route against the Portuguese attacks, vvhich hindered the Eastern Mediterranean trade business considerably, and against vvhich, the Mamluks vvere not povverful enough to resist. Despite not bringing a victory against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, the conquest of the Middle East and North Africa at least augmented the economic and military povver of the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. There vvas also an ideological stimulus for these conquests. Ruling the predominantly Müslim Arabian lands -including the holy lands of islam {Haremeyn)-and controlling the institution of caliphate (khilafe) vvould definitely empovver the Ottomans' claim for leadership in the Sunnite vvorld, vvhich vvould also be an asset vvhile struggling against the Shiite Safavids in the East. Motivated by these ideological, military and economic factors, the Ottoman rule in the Arab Middle East and North Africa lasted for more than three hundred years despite many hindrances.
Dissolution of the Ottoman rule över the Arabian lands occurred as a gradual process during the 19 th and early 20 th centuries. The nevv ovvners of these territories vvere the imperialist povvers, vvho vvere very much eager to find nevv markets and ravv material sources for their rapidly grovving national capitalist economies. By 1912, the vvhole North Africa had already been parcelled out among Britain, France and Italy, as if it vvas a prototype for the further partition of "the sick man of Europe", vvhose management had so far been among the most important factors in the maintenance of the European balance of povvers.
By 1914, the remaining Arab territories under the Ottoman rule vvere roughly the Greater Syria (including Palestine and Lebanon), Iraq, Yemen and Hijaz; ali of vvhich to be lost hereafter. The First World War, therefore, symbolizes the last years of nearly four centuries co-habitation of the Turks and the Arabs vvithin the same Empire. During this period, it vvas surely the Hijaz Revolt, besides the British military campaigns in Syria and Iraq, vvhich paved the vvay for the defeat of the Ottoman Army in the Arab lands, and thus, the separation of these regions from the Empire. As it vvas an action the Ottoman Empire.
2 It seems, therefore, ironic that the most successful Arab reaction against the Ottomans during the war years came from the Hijaz. This article argues that, this irony strengthens the view that there was, if any, a very weak link betvveen the idea of Arabism and the Hijaz Revolt, vvhich is most evident from the latter's failure to attract even the Arab elements of the Ottoman Army completely. Moreover, vvhile legitimising the revolt, its organizers adopted a religious discourse rather than nationalistic. This is not to say that the Hijaz Revolt was a religious reaction but just to stress the use of religion, in this case islam, in justifying the revolt.
Taking stock of the economic and political context, laid down above, this article will analyse the war-time relations between the Ottomans and the Arabs in the Hijaz as a case study, and, will proceed as follovvs: In the first part, the political climate that led the Emir of Mecca Sharif Husayn to revolt against the Ottomans will be analysed. In this context, the evolution of the Ottoman policy in the Hijaz just before and after the outbreak of the Great War, along with the reaction of the Hijazis, will be explained. The second part will deal with the evolvement of the revolt plan of Sharif Husayn by analysing his contacts with various parties, including the British, the Ottomans and some Syrian notables. The third part will try to reveal the role of the idea of Arabism and islam in the Hijaz Revolt, by taking a closer look at certain features of the revolt. In the last part, the Ottoman efforts to counter the revolt will be analysed.
1.
Before the outbreak of the Great War, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), vvho had taken direct control of the Empire on 23 January 1913 vvith a coup d'etat (Bâb-ı Âli Baskını), seemed very keen on establishing and maintaining a firm central control över the remaining provinces of the crumbling Empire. Given its religious importance for novv an overvvhelmingly Müslim Empire, the Hijaz was definitely not exempt from the implementation of this Traditionally, regional authority in the Hijaz province was shared between Ottoman governors and Emirs of Mecca. Emirs vvere appointed by Ottoman Sultans among the prominent members of the House of Hashem, who vvere believed to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. They had three main functions in the Hijaz: firstly, they vvere responsible for the supervision and safety of the Müslim pilgrimage (hajj); secondly, they acted vvith the government to extend its political and military authority in the province and its environs; and thirdly, they accepted the overlordship of the Ottoman Sultans and accordingly legitimised the religious claims of the Caliph-Sultan as "the servant of the sacred places" (khadim alharemeyn). 4 Doubtful of the loyalty of the Emir of Mecca Sharif Husayn, vvho had been appointed to this position by the end of 1908, and suspicious of his activities, Vehip Paşa set out energetically to enforce the CUP's centralization policy. As a result, the rivalry betvveen the Emir of Mecca and the governor of the Hijaz came to a head.
The governor and the Emir clashed över various issues, the most important of vvhich vvas the extension of the Hijaz Railroad from Medina to Mecca. Hijazi people vvere not in favour of the extension of the railroad. The Bedouins opposed it because it threatened their main livelihood, the camel rental, since pilgrims vvould prefer to travel by more convenient trains. 5 In addition, the deployment of 6 Thus, he feared that the same vvould happen to the vvhole province if the railroad vvas extended to Mecca. Secondly, the impact of the railroad on the pilgrimage threatened the povver that the Emir enjoyed through his control of the security of the pilgrimage route and also the income he derived from the camel rentals in vvhich he had at least a 25% share. 7 Hijazi tovvnsmen, too, opposed the extension of the railroad because of their fear of direct government control vvhich might lead to local conscription and an increase in taxes. 8 16 Sharif 'Ali, however, got no further than Medina where he stopped because one of his men had reportedly seized the suitcase of a well-known CUP member which contained secret correspondence between Vehip Paşa and İstanbul regarding plans to depose Sharif Husayn and abolish the special status of the Hijaz. The government, keen on maintaining the support of Sharif Husayn, accepted the request and gave money and arms to Husayn for the mobilization of volunteers. 19 Finally, as a response to the increasing Ottoman insistence, Husayn sent Sharif 'Ali to Medina with 1,500 Bedouin forces in order to proceed to Syria and join the campaign. Hovvever, these forces too remained in Medina for an extended period and a conflict started to develop between the muhafız of Medina Basri Paşa and Sharif 'Ali.
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Despite Ottoman desires, the population of the Hijaz had no interest in supporting any action hostile to the British since any such action would threaten their security and economic position. The dramatic decrease due to the war in the number of the pilgrims coming from the Allied colonies such as India and North Africa had already brought the main economic activity in the Hijaz to a halt and caused the Hijazis to "curse the war and those who caused it". 21 Additionally, the supremacy of the British navy in the Red Sea constituted a great threat to the Hijazis in the event of their support of any hostile action against the British, so that a trade blockade that could be exerted by Britain on the Hijaz coasts would have had disastrous consequences for the region. 22 Consequently s this fragile situation in the region gave Sharif Husayn a useful reason for not 19 participating in any hostile actions against the British as well as for not approving or promoting the Ottoman Sultan's cali for jihad.
2.
In this political climate, Sharif Husayn calculated his advantages well and decided to find a solution for the Hijaz outside the Ottoman framework. His contacts with the British and with some Syrians vvere of great importance in the formulation of his new policy tovvards the Ottomans. On the basis of the available evidence, it can be argued that he had decided to break vvith the Ottomans before the outbreak of the Great War, as early as February 1914, vvhile the centralization measures of the CUP vvere mounting in the Hijaz. Hovvever, after the suspension of the centralization measures in March 1914 and the subsequent recall of Vehip Paşa, the tide of events, particularly the outbreak of the vvar, gave Sharif Husayn the finest opportunity to strengthen his ties vvith Britain in order to gain his independence from the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, Sharif Husayn's decision to break vvith the Ottomans should not be considered exclusively related to the CUP's centralization policy, vvhich had been suspended in the Hijaz in March 1914, but to the current political climate in vvhich Husayn calculated his best interests as being vvith the British.
Anglo-Sharifian contacts started in February 1914 in Cairo betvveen Sharif 'Abdallah, son of Sharif Husayn, and Lord Kitchener, the British High-Commissioner in Egypt. In this meeting, 'Abdallah complained about the nevv governor of the Hijaz Vehip Paşa, "vvho is not in sympathy vvith the people and vvho does not act harmoniously vvith his father in the conduct of internal affairs of the holy places as vvell as comfort and security of Moslem pilgrims coming from ali över the vvorld." He asked "vvhether in case this friction become [ Kitchener's response was that "if the Amir and Arabs in general assist Great Britain in this conflict that has been forced upon us (by) Turkey, Great Britain will promise not to intervene in any manner vvhatsoever whether in things religious or otherwise. Moreover recognising and respecting the sacred and unique office of the Amir Hosayn, Great Britain will guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sharifate against ali external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans."
26 Sharif 'Abdallah replied to these pledges that his father had no intention of adopting a policy hostile to British interests, while Sharif Husayn himself, in a verbal message, stated that his position in the world of islam and the present political situation in the Hijaz made it impossible for him to break with the Ottomans immediately, though he was waiting for a suitable pretext. 27 Syria in order to join the Second Canal Campaign. 36 Considering the crucial state of the war for the Ottomans, Husayn's telegram can only be described as an attempt to fınd a "pretext" for his planned rebellion. Nevertheless, the Ottoman authorities do not seem to have been interested in taking any preventive actions över the suspicious activities of Sharif Husayn. Instead, İstanbul vvas content vvith merely urging him to recall Sharif 'Ali to Mecca and threatening that he would not see his other son Sharif Faysal, who was in Syria at that time, until the despatch of the Bedouin forces to Syria. 37 During the subsequent correspondence betvveen Husayn and İstanbul, the conciliatory policy of the Ottomans towards Husayn continued, so that in the end, instead of taking preventive actions, they came into an understanding with Husayn that Sharif Faysal vvould go back to Medina to fetch the Bedouin volunteers; as soon as he arrived in Medina, Sharif 'Ali would return to Mecca, and, after the arrival of the Bedouin forces in Syria, the issue of amnesty vvould be considered by Cemal Paşa. 
3.
Although Sharif Husayn's revolt led to the events that resulted in a total break between the Turks and the Arabs, it cannot be considered a reaction of the Arabs as a whole against the Ottoman Empire. It was rather a local reaction with the support of an external power. The extent to vvhich the revolt was a local affair, driven largely by one man's ambitions rather than by any vvide-appeal idea of Arabism can be seen in the limited range of Sharif Husayn's influence which stretched only to the Hijaz and, to a smaller extent, its environs, and, was extremely dependent on British support. According to a British intelligence officer, Sir Wyndham Deedes, Sharif Husayn was not recognised as a very powerful figüre in the other Arab lands and it is impossible for Syrians, Yemenis and Iraqis to be under the rule of one chief even if they may acknowledge one spiritual chief. 41 Moreover, a contemporary British report suggests that the people of Mecca were almost pro-Ottomans and those on the side of Sharif Husayn were about 5,000 people among whom the men of influence were about 500. 42 The lack of enthusiasm among the Arab elements of the Ottoman Army about the revolt was also a sign of the local character of Sharif Husayn's movement. Arab prisoners of war, vvho were sent to prisoner camps in India and Egypt, were viewed by the British and the Sharifs as potential conscripts to the revolting army. This method, hovvever, had little success because the overwhelming majority of the 45 The high number of Arab deserters, hovvever, did not necessarily mean that ali of those deserters fought on Sharif Husayn's side. In contrast, most of them preferred to return to their homes or hide from their Ottoman pursuers until the end of the vvar. 46 Furthermore, some Baghdadi officers, vvho had deserted to the Sharifian forces, posed great problems for both the Sharifs and the British. In some British reports, they vvere accused of being proTurkish and vvorking only for their ovvn economic interests by stealing the money and the stores sent by the British to the revolting army. It vvas claimed that they vvere doing tremendous harm "in the Hedjaz by starting ali that vvas bad in the former Turkish rule," and also in the prestige of Husayn among the Bedouins. 47 Moreover, they vvere accused of hindering any sort of action against the Ottomans by breaking the guns. 48 In this sense, they vvere also suspected of being Ottoman agents. 
52
"To most of them" says Lavvrence referring to the Al-'Ahd members, "the vvord vvas never given; for those societies pro-Arab only, vvilling to fight for nothing but Arab independence; and they could see no advantage in supporting the Allies rather than the Turks, since they did not believe our assurances that we vvould leave them free." Lawrence, Seven, p. 23. 54 Bremond, Hedjaz, p. 14.
Bedouins during the revolt rested on two majör factors: money and military power. Both Sharif Husayn and the Ottomans fought to win över them, but in the end it vvas the party vvhich paid more money,' contributed more grain and demonstrated greater power which secured Bedouin support. It seems, therefore, disputable that the Bedouins vvere motivated by nationalist aspirations or religious sentiments. It was rather some short-term economic calculations that drove most of them against the Ottomans. Sharif Husayn's forces, vvith the exception of ex-Ottoman officers who joined the rebels after the outbreak of the rebellion, vvere almost entirely made up of Bedouins. 56 The financial contribution of Britain was essential for Husayn to win över the Bedouins. In August 1915, a famous member of the Sharifian family expressed to the British that Sharif Husayn's good relations vvith the Arabs of desert vvas dependent on his money and grain contribution to them, and thus, British contribution to Husayn in terms of money, grain and arms vvas essential for Husayn's consolidation of povver in Arabia. 57 Britain provided gold and foodstuff to the Bedouins mainly via Sharif Husayn. In September 1916, McMahon urged Sharif Husayn that "he should endeavour to counteract the influence of Turkish gold among the Arab tribes by more generous payments on his ovvn part." 58 The source of these "generous payments" vvas predictably the British.
Despite the fact that islam vvas not the majör driving force in the actions of the Bedouins, vvho vvere the most important contingent of the revolting army, it vvas definitely the main pillar of Sharif Husayn's propaganda. Sharif Husayn commenced his religious propaganda on 26 June 1916, issuing a proclamation to the Islamic world in order to legitimise his actions against the Ottomans. 59 In this proclamation, after complimenting the House of Osman and stating that the Emirs of Mecca were the first Müslim princes to acknovvledge the Ottoman government, Husayn mentioned his service for the government över the past years while fighting with the Ottomans against rebellions in the region. Afterwards, he described how the Empire had become corrupt and decayed in the hands of the CUP and accused it of dragging the Empire into the war vvhich brought pain and poverty to the last Islamic Empire of the world and particularly to the holy lands of islam. He further accused the government of issuing a paper called İçtihad in vvhich the biography of the Prophet was vvritten in a very disrespectful manner; rejecting God's vvord: "the male must obtain the double of the female" and making them equal in inheritance; allovving the troops in the Mecca, Medina and Damascus garrisons to break their fasts during Ramadan; diminishing the povver of the Ottoman Sultan by forbidding him even to choose for himself the chief of his personal cabinet; instructing the judge of the "Mohammaden Court of Mecca" to reject the evidence of believers outside the courts; hanging "at one time of 21 men among the learned Muslems and the Chiefs of Arabs" and deporting their innocent families to remote regions vvhile confiscating their properties; digging up the tomb of "the Grand Emir and ascetic person" Al Sayyed al-Sharif 'Abd al-Kader al-Jazairi al-Hassani and scattering his bones; and finally firing at the K'abe and damaging its holy cover (qiswa).
It is knovvn that the proclamation, before it was published in Cairo, had been amended slightly by the British, after the French had expressed their anxieties about the passages vvhich condemned the Ottoman government for allovving troops to break their fasts and över the passage on evidence in the religious courts since France vvas also 59 exercising the same measures in its Müslim colonies. 60 Rashid Rida, the editör of Al-Manar in Cairo also intended to make some amendments in order to give the proclamation a more nationalistic colour before its publication, hovvever, Sharif has reportedly rejected and the original proclamation vvas published. 61 Obviously, the main aim of Sharif Husayn's proclamation vvas to justify the rebellion in the eyes of Muslims, most of vvhom vvere living under the British rule and most of vvhom had already condemned the Sharif for jeopardizing the holy lands of islam. In this sense, the only passage that touched on the cause of Arabs vvas the execution of tvventy one Arab notables, vvithout even emphasizing their Arabist thoughts.
On 9 September 1916, Sharif issued his second proclamation in Al-Qibla nevvspaper, his official mouthpiece. 62 This time, Husayn produced a more political argument against the policies of the CUP, though some religious points remained. Aftervvards, the Sharif issued tvvo more proclamations in November 1916 and March 1917 in AlQibla. 6i In these proclamations, Sharif vvent on condemning the "vvicked" actions of the CUP such as "plundering" the tomb of the Prophet in Medina, vvhile making many references to his first tvvo proclamations. 64 It is also interesting that the vvord "Turanist" vvas employed by the Sharif in the last tvvo proclamations vvhile referring to the CUP. Considering the contexts of these proclamations, it can be said that this vvord vvas used by Husayn to denounce the actions of the CUP vvhich vvere claimed to be in contradiction to the teachings of islam, rather than to express a nationalist reaction to its "Turanist" policies.
4.
Once the revolt broke out in the summer of 1916, the Ottomans follovved a policy, on the one hand, of bribery among the Bedouins and of countering the religious propaganda used by Sharif Husayn, and, on the other, of denial of any "Arab" nature of the revolt. Throughout the revolt, the Ottomans provided grain and gold to ensure the loyalty of the Bedouins. In a letter to the Commandant of Yanbo, intercepted and forvvarded by the Sharifian forces to the British, the muhafız of Medina Basri Paşa stated that "large amount of gold and decorations have been given Arabs round Medina to bribe them and telling commandant to do likewise" in Yanbo. 65 In September 1916, the government decided to seli wheat, that was brought to Hijaz by trains, for half of its real cost to the Hijazi Bedouins who were stili loyal to the Ottomans. 66 Naci Kâşif relates that the loyalty of the tribesmen along the Hijaz Railway up to Medina vvas to a great extent maintained thanks to the utilization of train vvagons in distribution of the grains to the Bedouins. The situation, hovvever, vvas not the same betvveen Mecca and Medina due to the absence of a railvvay on this line. 67 The Ottoman government also avvarded medals to the Bedouin shaykhs, again in an attempt to ensure their allegiance. In August 1916, Cemal Paşa proposed the Ministry of the Interior to avvard Ottoman medals to Hamid Abu Shamar from the Beli tribes, Nuri alShalan from the Ruvvala tribes, and some of their relatives because of their loyalties to the government after the outbreak of the Hijaz Revolt. 68 Apart from the use of money, foodstuffs and medals to ensure the loyalty of the Bedouins, the Ottoman government also attempted to counter the religious propaganda used by Sharif Husayn at the beginning of the revolt. Shortly after the outbreak of the revolt, the Ottomans, on 1 July 1916, appointed Sharif Husayn's rival, Sharif 'Ali Haydar, as the new Emir of Mecca. 69 On 9 August 1916, fourteen days after his arrival in Medina, Sharif 'Ali Haydar issued his counter-proclamation, in which he denounced the actions of Sharif Husayn and justified the policies of the Ottoman government from a religious as well as a political perspective.
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The Ottoman government did not make the news of revolt public for more than a month after it had broken out. Then, on 26 July 1916 an article called "Intrigue in Mecca" (Mekke'deki Fesat) appeared in T anin nevvspaper, the unofficial mouthpiece of the CUP. This article reflects the main argument of the CUP against the rebellion of Sharif Husayn that this revolt was not representative of the Arab population as a whole and that, contrary to any such idea, there was no Turkish -Arab division, the Turks and Arabs being united as members of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, it is also claimed that neither Arabism nor Islamism vvas concerned in the revolt, and that the sources of the intrigue in the Hijaz vvere personal aspirations of Husayn and "the joining to Husayn of some vagabond tribesmen of vvhom the main livelihood had alvvays been pillage." 71 Moreover, according to the article, Britain vvas "deceived by the spurious influence of Sharif Husayn" and plotted this revolt vvith gold. 72 Finally, it is claimed that although the government vvas avvare of the real intentions of Sharif Husayn for a long time, it did not take any actions mainly because there vvere more important issues to be dealt vvith and also because the government thought that Husayn's ambitions for kingship, that had been "burning his heart" for quite a long time, could be extinguished by good management. 73 Tovvards the end of the vvar, the Ottoman government, deeply concerned about the struggle against the rebels, attempted to arrange 69 7anm, 02.07.1916, p. 1. Since 1840, there vvas a rivalry betvveen tvvo clans of the House of Hashem: Dhavvu-'Avvn and Dhavvu-Zayd. Sharif Husayn vvas a member of the former, vvhile his rival, Shaıif 'Ali Haydar vvas a member of the latter. 70 The full text of the original proclamation can be found in Tanin 77 Therefore, here vve come to the conclusion that by the first quarter of the 20 th century, the British took advantage of the Sharifian family as an agent to instigate, conquer and finally to control the Arab Middle East. While the Ottomans vvere striving to counter the revolt by dispensing gold, grain and medals, they vvere actually contending vvith the British vvho provided the Sharifan family vvith gold, grain and arms. Under these conditions, one can argue that Ottoman -Arab relations in the Hijaz during the vvar developed as a matter of struggle betvveen tvvo hostile states, vvho vvere Britain and the Ottoman Empire, to vvin över local tribes and leaders by bribery and propaganda. In the end, it vvas the British (via the Sharifian family) vvho secured the support of the majority of the local tribes and leaders, and drove them against the Ottomans.
To conclude, Sharif Husayn's ambitions for independence combined vvith British imperialist designs in the Middle East and produced the Hijaz Revolt during the very crucial years of the Great War. Therefore, as a partial confirmation of the article that appeared in Tanin on 26 July 1916, it can be argued that reasons behind the revolt vvere in fact economic and political rather than religious or nationalistic. Hovvever, Husayn's religious constraints in the holy lands of islam compelled him and his sons to employ a more religious language to carry out and justify their actions. 78 While the Ottoman 77 At present, the rule of the Hashemite dynasty continues only in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 78 Before starting his actions, the Sharif's main concern vvas religious. He vvas afraid of being condemned by the Islamic vvorld because he rose against the caliphate. He several times expressed these concerns to the British. PRO, FO 141/461-1, from Governor General in Khartoum to Clayton in policy shifted from firm centralization to attempted conciliation, then to failure to respond to the growing threat of revolt effectively, and finally to unsuccessful bids for peace, Sharif Husayn's policy moved from somewhat unconvincing accommodation to outright rebellion. In the end, although it succeeded in driving off the Ottomans from the Arab lands and thus opening a nevv phase in the course of TurkishArab relations, the revolt of Sharif Husayn does not represent an overvvhelming expression of Arab sentiment against the Ottomans. It vvas rather a local reaction vvhich took advantage of the general state of the vvar and the conciliatory policies of the centre, and vvhich exceeded its natural limits of success thanks to the support of a Great Povver. This, hovvever, does not change the fact that the revolt remains to be a traumatic moment in the social memory of the Turkish people since it has long been used and is stili being used by Turkish elites as an instrument to strengthen their nationalist and secularist discourse.
